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Summary
Analogical reasoning is vital to advanced cognition and
behavioral adaptation. Many theorists deem analogical
thinking to be uniquely human and to be foundational to
categorization, creative problem solving, and scientific dis-
covery [1]. Comparative psychologists have long been inter-
ested in the species generality of analogical reasoning, but
they initially found it difficult to obtain empirical support
for such thinking in nonhuman animals (for pioneering
efforts, see [2, 3]). Researchers have sincemustered consid-
erable evidence and argument that relational matching-to-
sample (RMTS) effectively captures the essence of analogy,
in which the relevant logical arguments are presented visu-
ally [4]. In RMTS, choice of test pair BB would be correct if
the sample pair were AA, whereas choice of test pair EF
would be correct if the sample pair were CD. Critically, no
items in the correct test pair physically match items in the
sample pair, thus demanding that only relational sameness
or differentness is available to support accurate choice re-
sponding. Initial evidence suggested that only humans and
apes can successfully learn RMTS with pairs of sample
and test items [4–7]; however, monkeys have subsequently
done so [8–12]. Here, we report that crows too exhibit rela-
tional matching behavior. Even more importantly, crows
spontaneously display relational responding without ever
having been trained on RMTS; they had only been trained
on identity matching-to-sample (IMTS). Such robust and
uninstructed relational matching behavior represents the
most convincing evidence yet of analogical reasoning in a
nonprimate species, as apes alone [7] have spontaneously
exhibited RMTS behavior after only IMTS training.
Results and Discussion
Our findings come from three separate behavioral assess-
ments that followed pretraining and pretesting on identity
matching-to-sample (IMTS; see the Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures available online), deploying behavioral
methods that were earlier used by Smirnova, Lazareva, and
Zorina [13]. In that prior IMTS period, two hooded crows
were shown several different kinds of visual stimuli: single
stimuli of varying colors or shapes and clusters of stimuli
containing varying numbers of items. The birds were taught
to match stimuli by color, shape, and number of items,
but not size. After learning these various IMTS tasks, the
crows reliably transferred discriminative responding to new
stimuli from the same categories that were used in training*Correspondence: ed-wasserman@uiowa.edu(Table S2) as well as to stimuli from an altogether different
category (Figure S2)—stimuli varying in size—suggesting
that the birds had acquired a general rule that was based on
physical identity [14].
The key behavioral assessments followed, in which novel
pairs of items served as the sample and test stimuli [7]. The
visual dimensions in these assessments were size, shape,
and color (Figures 1, 2, and 3 show several illustrative, not
actual, trial sequences). On identity trials, we arranged differ-
ential reinforcement (food was given only after correct
choices) to promote continued discriminative responding;
accurate choice responding here could be based on either
physical or relational matches between the sample pair and
the correct test pair. On the critical relational trials, we
arranged nondifferential reinforcement (food was given after
all choices) because we did not want to teach the crows the
very behavior that we were assessing; accurate choice re-
sponding here could only be based on relational matches be-
tween the sample pair and the correct test pair. Assessment
sessions were conducted 5 days a week and contained 48
trials: 36 identity trials and 12 relational trials. The sessions
contained six blocks (each block containing six identity trials
and two relational trials); the trial order was randomized within
each of the six blocks. On all trials, we scored as ‘‘correct’’
those choices that accorded with relational matching. Each
assessment phase lasted eight sessions.
The first assessment phase involved size. Figure 1 shows
that on half of the trials the sample pair involved shapes of
the same size, whereas on the other half of the trials the sam-
ple pair involved shapes of different sizes. With the different-
sized sample and choice pairs, the large shape always
appeared on the left and the small shape always appeared
on the right in order to keep the number of sample-compari-
son combinations within manageable limits. The palette of
simple black shapes from which the sample and test pairs
could be selected contained a square, a rectangle, a circle,
an oval, a wide triangle, and a narrow triangle. These shapes
could be large or small; the overall area of the two test pairs
was equated, so that this stimulus property could not control
the crows’ behavior. Identity matching trials were arranged in
which one test pair presented the same shapes in the same
sizes as the sample pair; each of the sample and test pairs
involved the same shape, and only correct choices were
reinforced on these trials. Relational matching trials were
arranged in which neither of the test pairs matched the sample
pair in shape, thereby eliminating control by physical identity;
on these trials, either correct or incorrect choices were
reinforced.
The second assessment phase involved shape. Figure 2
shows that on half of the trials the sample pair involved iden-
tical shapes, whereas on the other half of the trials the sample
pair involved nonidentical shapes. In this assessment phase
and the next, the items in each pair were arranged along the
positive diagonal in order for the spatial arrangement to differ
from the horizontal arrangement in the prior assessment phase
and to keep the number of sample-comparison combinations
within manageable limits. The palette of shapes contained
equal-sized circles, squares, triangles, and crosses that could
be colored red, yellow, blue, or green. Identity matching trials
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Figure 1. Examples of Identity and Relational Trials across Eight Exemplary
Trials for Size Stimuli
On three-fourths of the trials (1–3 and 5–7), the correct test stimulus was an
identity match to the sample. On one-fourth of the trials (4 and 8, shaded
gray), the correct test stimulus was a relational match to the sample.
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Figure 2. Examples of Identity and Relational Trials across Eight Exemplary
Trials for Shape Stimuli
On three-fourths of the trials (1–3 and 5–7), the correct test stimulus was
an identity match to the sample in shape. On one-fourth of the trials
(4 and 8, shaded gray), the correct test stimulus was a relational match to
the sample.
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shapes as the sample pair; only correct choices were rein-
forced on these trials. Relational matching trials were arranged
in which neither of the test pairs matched the sample pair
in shape or color, thereby eliminating control by physical iden-
tity; on these trials, either correct or incorrect choices were
reinforced.
The third assessment phase involved color (crows have
excellent color vision [15]). Figure 3 shows that on half of
the trials the sample pair involved identical colors, whereas
on the other half of the trials the sample pair involved
nonidentical colors. The palette of colors contained equal-
sized circles, squares, triangles, and crosses that could be
shown in red, yellow, blue, or green. Identity matching trials
were arranged in which one test pair presented the same
colors as the sample pair; only correct choices were rein-
forced on these trials. Relational matching trials were ar-
ranged in which neither of the test pairs matched the sample
pair in color or shape, thereby eliminating control by physical
identity; on these trials, either correct or incorrect choices
were reinforced.
In the size-assessment phase, 60 combinations of stimuli
were used as samples on relational trials (they were never
repeated within sessions and were presented a maximum
of two times, in different locations, across sessions) and 12
combinations of stimuli were used as samples on identity tri-
als (they were never repeated within sessions and were pre-
sented a maximum of 24 times across sessions). In the shape
and color assessment phases, trial-unique combinations of
stimuli were used as samples on all relational and identity
trials.
Throughout all three assessment phases, the crows ex-
hibited highly accurate choice responding on both identity
and relational trials (fourth column in Table 1). We individually
assessed each crow’s behavior with a logistic regression
examining trial type, stimulus dimension, and session. Theseregression analyses revealed no significant changes in choice
accuracy over the eight sessions in each phase [crow 1: c2(1) =
0.94, p = 0.33; crow 2: c2(1) = 1.57, p = 0.21] and no interactions
of Session with the other variables (daily accuracy scores are
reported in Table S1, and details of the statistical analyses
are reported in the Supplemental Experimental Procedures);
therefore, subsequent discussion does not consider this
factor.
We next compared accuracy scores on the different kinds
of trials against 50% (representing random choice between
the test pairs). Averaged across all eight sessions, crow 1
responded at significantly above chance accuracy levels to
all six different kinds of stimuli (B = 1.06, SE = 0.068, Z =
15.57, p < 0.0001), with accuracy ranging from 61.46% to
79.51% correct. There was a significant main effect of trial
type [c2(1) = 3.99, p = 0.0457], with slightly lower accuracy
on relational trials (69.44%) than on identity trials (75.46%).
There was also a marginally significant trial type 3 stimulus
dimension interaction [c2(2) = 5.67, p = 0.059]. Follow-up tests
within each stimulus dimension disclosed that the interaction
was due to a significant effect of trial type for the color dimen-
sion (B =20.68, SE = 0.25, Z = 2.74, p = 0.0061), but not for the
shape (B = 0.18, SE = 0.27, Z = 0.68, p = 0.49) or size dimen-
sions (B = 20.36, SE = 0.27, Z = 1.33, p = 0.183), suggesting
that accuracy on color relational trials was a bit poorer than
on the remaining kinds of trials. Averaged across all eight ses-
sions, crow 2 responded at significantly above chance accu-
racy levels to all six different kinds of stimuli (B = 1.13, SE =
0.067, Z = 16.34, p < 0.0001). Accuracy ranged from 71.18%
to 78.82% correct, with accuracy being numerically (but not
reliably) lower on identity trials (72.22%) than on relational tri-
als (80.56%). The logistic regression yielded no other signifi-
cant effects.
Because of the importance of spontaneity to interpreting the
crows’ relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) behavior, we
Trial Left Test Sample Right Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Figure 3. Examples of Identity and Relational Trials across Eight Exemplary
Trials for Color Stimuli
On three-fourths of the trials (1–3 and 5–7), the correct test stimulus was
an identity match to the sample in color. On one-fourth of the trials (4 and
8, shaded gray), the correct test stimulus was a relational match to the
sample.
Table 1. Mean Percentage of Correct Choices by Crows 1 and 2
Dimension Trial Type Session 1 Sessions 1–8
Crow 1
Size Identity 77.78 79.51
relational 75.00 72.92
Shape identity 75.00 70.83
relational 91.67 73.96
Color identity 66.67 76.04
relational 58.33 61.46
Crow 2
Size identity 75.00 76.39
relational 91.67 76.04
Shape identity 63.89 71.18
relational 75.00 77.08
Color identity 77.78 78.82
relational 75.00 71.88
Accuracy scores are from identity (IMTS) and relational (RMTS) trials on all
three dimensions in session 1 and across sessions 1–8. See also Table S1.
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ment phase (third column in Table 1) using a similar logistic
regression as in the prior analyses. In session 1, crow 1 re-
sponded at significantly above chance levels of accuracy
(B = 1.08, SE = 0.20, Z = 5.39, p < 0.0001), but therewere no sig-
nificant effects of trial type or stimulus dimension; summed
across all three dimensions, accuracy on identity trials aver-
aged 73.15% correct, and accuracy on relational trials aver-
aged 75.00% correct. Crow 2 also responded at significantly
above chance accuracy levels in session 1 (B = 1.11, SE =
0.20, Z = 5.53, p < 0.0001), but there were no significant effects
of trial type or stimulus dimension; summed across all three
dimensions, accuracy on identity trials averaged 72.22%
correct, and accuracy on relational trials averaged 80.56%
correct.
We thus found that, when tested during the size-assess-
ment phase immediately after initial IMTS training, our crows
not only responded discriminatively on identity matching
trials, but also did so on relational matching trials, all of
these trials for the first time involving two-item sample and
test stimuli. These results represent striking behavioral evi-
dence that the crows spontaneously perceived the relation
between relations without ever having been explicitly trained
to do so.
That initial size assessment entailed sample and compari-
son stimuli that were horizontally ordered large (left) to small
(right) with different-sized pairs. Could that incidental spatial
cue have affected the accuracy of the crows’ later choice
behavior? Evidently not. The crows continued to respond at
similarly high levels of accuracy on identity and relational trials
during the shape and color assessment phases, during which
the items in the sample and comparison pairs were diagonally
arranged.
This documentation of RMTS behavior is particularly note-
worthy because our crows exhibited discriminative relationalmatching (averaging 77.78% correct) that was just as robust
as their identity matching (averaging 72.69%) in session 1
across all three assessment phases. Although physical iden-
tity could have guided the crows’ choice behavior on IMTS tri-
als, physical identity could not have done so on RMTS trials, as
no physical matches were possible between the sample pairs
and the correct test pairs. These results perhaps surprisingly
suggest that physical identity contributed little or nothing to
our crows’ testing performance; relational processing seems
to have been of prime importance to controlling the birds’
choice behavior.
Our results thus constitute unprecedented behavioral evi-
dence of analogical reasoning by a nonprimate animal. They
therefore add to growing research undermining the influential
claims of such famous philosophers as Rene´ Descartes and
John Locke that only humans are capable of abstract thought.
Relational reasoning—particularly appreciating the relation
between relations, as in analogies—can no longer be deemed
to be the unique pinnacle of human cognition.
It may be no accident that crows performed so impressively
in our study; they stand out among birds in their highly devel-
oped neuroanatomy [16, 17]. More generally, mounting evi-
dence indicates that although birds do not have a brain
structure that is homologous to the mammalian prefrontal
cortex, the avian nidopallium caudolaterale may effectively
mediate complex cognitive functions, perhaps representing
a case of convergent evolution [18].
It should nevertheless be appreciated that we are not claim-
ing that our crows’ spontaneous relational matching behavior
arose entirely de novo. Indeed, we believe that their earlier
IMTS training is likely to have enabled them to grasp a broadly
applicable concept of sameness that could apply to novel two-
item sample and test stimuli involving only relational sameness
[19, 20]. Just how that remarkable transfer is accomplished
represents an intriguing matter for future study. Nor are we
claiming that crows will prove to be the only nonprimate ani-
mals that are capable of exhibiting such spontaneous rela-
tional matching behavior. Future researchmust be undertaken
in which different species are given comparable pretraining
experience to our crows. Until such systematic comparative
research is conducted, it would be premature to offer specula-
tive evolutionary accounts as to why crows appear to have
excelled in solving this challenging cognitive task. It would
also be premature to suggest that simply because crows
259successfully master RMTS tasks, they process the stimuli and
relations in the same way as do humans and other nonhuman
animals.
Finally, we should underscore the importance of research on
animal behavior to the role of language or symbol systems in
abstract conceptualization. The first evidence of analogical
reasoning in animals came from symbol-trained chimpanzees
[2, 5]. Accordingly, the hypothesis was advanced that only if an
organism had acquired an elaborate symbol system might it
encode and process abstract analogical relations [5]. The re-
sults of more recent primate studies [6, 7, 12], as well as the
findings from our present experiment with crows, suggest
that extensive prior experience with the abstract concept of
‘‘sameness’’ per se—rather than a linguistic symbol for such
a concept—is sufficient for animals to succeed in solving
analogical reasoning tasks.
Experimental Procedures
Subjects
Two experimentally naive hooded crows (Corvus corone), at least 2 years
old, served as subjects. Both were housed in the aviary of the Biology
Department of Lomonosov Moscow State University, Russia. Throughout
the experiment, the birds had free access to water. Mealworms were
used as reinforcement, as they are crows’ favorite food and are attractive
at most food-deprivation levels. If the crows refused to work in the exper-
iment, then they received food without animal protein for 1 or 2 days.
Refusals to work meant that unfinished sessions were continued on the
next day. All of this research was conducted in full compliance with
Russian research regulations: specifically, the bioethical requirements of
Directive 86 EC.
Apparatus
A wire mesh cage (70 cm3 35 cm3 35 cm; 4 cm3 4 cmmesh spacing) and
a plastic tray (20 cm 3 30 cm) with a handle (30 cm) were used for training
and testing (Figure S1). Two cups (3.7 cm high and 5.0 cm in diameter)
were placed on the tray; during training, one cup contained twomealworms
and the other cup was empty, whereas during testing both cups contained
mealworms. The cups were covered by the comparison stimuli. The sample
stimulus was placed between the comparison stimuli. All of the stimuli were
drawn on cardboard cards (7 cm 3 7 cm). An opaque plastic screen (70 3
40 cm) was placed between the experimenter and the crow; neither the
bird nor the experimenter could see one another, precluding a ‘‘Clever
Hans’’ error. Before each trial, the tray was prepared out of the bird’s sight.
The Supplemental Information includes additional procedural details, con-
trols for confounded variables, and Movie S1 (a reenactment showing
crow 1 performing the task).
General Procedure
The crows were trained and tested in two-alternative simultaneous match-
ing-to-sample tasks. During the experiment, a bird was placed into the
experimental cage. A trial started when the tray—containing the sample
stimulus card in the center and the two cups covered by the comparison
stimulus cards on each side—was slid into the cage. So that the crow could
be given the opportunity to get acquainted with all three stimuli, the tray was
initially placed in front of the bird for 2 to 3 s as the first step of the trial; the
crow could see the cards, but it could not uncover the cups. Then, the sec-
ond step followed. The tray was movedmore deeply into the cage; the crow
uncovered one of the cups and, in case of the correct choice, it received
food. If the bird did not choose either card within 2 min, then the tray was
removed from the cage. Which sample stimulus would be presented was
determined by a quasirandom schedule under the restrictions that (1) the
same card could not be used as a samplemore than two times in succession
and (2) the correct stimulus could not appear in the right or left locationmore
than two times in succession. Otherwise, the order of stimulus presentation
and the pairing of sample and comparison stimuli were randomized on each
trial.
The minimum intertrial interval (ITI) was about 1 min, essentially the time
to prepare the tray with new stimuli and mealworms. The maximum ITI was
5 min. If the bird did not choose either card within 2 min, then the tray was
removed from the cage. The experimenter gave the bird a 5 min break andrepeated that trial. If the bird again did not choose either card, then the
experimenter ended the session.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures, two figures, two tables, and one movie and can be found with this
article online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2014.11.063.
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